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The enemy will be difforeut . ... No longer will it be the simple terrorist armed 
with an AK-47 or the Semtex bomb . .. the new threat will be groups who will bond 
in cyber space and attack using the new weapons £?f war: viruses, bugs, worms and 
logic bombs. 1 
T he front cover of a recent Armed Forces Journal has an American soldier on a rope bridge suspended over a chasm with the title "Ready for What?"2 
This is a key question for national security policy makers regarding the mission 
of US Armed Forces as the world moves into the uncharted waters of the new 
millennium.3 
Institutionally, the national security structure of the United States is facing 
many challenges. Configured to meet the Soviet threat, the Armed Forces, as 
well as the intelligence community, are realizing that changes must be made.4 
The question posed above, however, is relevant regarding the issue of being 
ready for the ne:xt threat. What are the threats that face our national security and 
how should we be organized functionally to meet those challenges, particularly 
as they relate to the dimension of cyberspace? 
The geopolitical world of the 20th Century, drawn along colonial and ideo-
logical lines, is fading into the past. The threats faced by the United States today 
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are not just standing industrial age arrni<:s, but international criminals, terrorists, 
and State and non-State actors using relatively inexpensive and easily attained 
technology to manufacture weapons of mass destruction.5 
Throughout history, man has waged warfare, conducted commerce, and 
established an international political regime in a three-dimensional environ-
ment. Mankind has faced and conquered the land, the sea, and the air above, 
moving freely about in these dimensions. Yet mankind has created another di-
mension which will shape its evolution well past the start of this millennium. 
That dimension is cyberspace. It is in this dimension that both the legal and in-
telligence communities, among others, will have to develop an ability to 
operate. 
Among the practices of States, intelligence gathering is accepted as a necessity 
in conducting foreign relations.6 Throughout history, State actors have been 
collecting information on the intentions, capabilities, and policies of both 
friendly and rival States? 
In the information age, intelligence plays an increasingly important role.8 In-
formation is the new strategic high ground. For the past fifty years or so the intel-
ligence community of the United States focused on the Soviet Union and its 
allies, mainly the Warsaw Pact countries.9 The mission was clear and the com-
munity organized itself accordingly to provide critical information to the Na-
tional Command Authorities1o on Soviet capabilities and intentions.!1 This 
organizational model, however, may no longer be valid.12 
Due to the ever-increasing challenges in gathering that information against a 
hard target, the community began to rely more and more on its technical capa-
bilities. Imagery intelligence and signals intelligence provided spectacular cover-
age and monitoring of Soviet communications and critical strategic targets.13 At 
times this was at the expense of the other intelligence collection methods such as 
human-source intelligence (HUMINT).!4 In the asymmetric world of the 21st 
Century, HUMINT and open source intelligence (OSINT) will playa key 
role.15 This role will not change in the dimension of cyberspace and computer 
network attack or defense.16 Additionally, the computer will become a useful 
tool for an intelligence operative or analyst to use.17 
Throughout our history, however, the role of intelligence in defending our 
nation has been misunderstood.18 The methodologies of intelligence gathering 
can, to some citizens, appear to run counter to the basic principles of a free and 
open society.19 Though Americans are fascinated by the capabilities of the com-
munity, they have an unrealistic romantic view of the often dangerous and dirty 
world of intelligence gathering.2o 
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The Role of Intelligence in the United States 
Until the Second World War, US intelligence played a minor role in protect-
ing our national security. Only during time of war did an intelligence service 
emerge to support the commander in the field. After the emergency, the intelli-
gence capabilities of the US diminished or were disbanded.21 
Counterintelligence played even less of a role and was largely nonexistent 
prior to the First World War.22 Domestically, the counterintelligence service 
became a profession in the 1920s with the advent of the Bureau ofInvestigation 
in the Department of Justice (later the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation) and the 
creation of various service counterintelligence organizations.23 
The intelligence community has also had an awkward relationship with the 
Congress. Until the mid-1970s, Congress deferred to the executive branch on 
issues of national security as a constitutional prerogative of the President acting as 
Commander-in-Chie£24 In the early 1970s, allegations of wrongdoing by the 
intelligence community caused a public outcry and resulted in long-term con-
gressional and presidential scrutiny.25 The result was the creation of the con-
gressional intelligence oversight committees and presidential guidelines on the 
proper conduct of intelligence operations, particularly as they related to US per-
sons.26 Those policies and regulations are still in place and govern the intelli-
gence activities discussed later in this chapter. 
Thus, the US intelligence community truly was a creature of the Cold War 
designed to operate in three dimensions.27 It was created and designed to counter 
Soviet hegemony, largely an industrial age threat. With the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, and the advent of the information age, the intelligence commu-
nity, a large and cumbersome bureaucracy, has to evolve into a quick reacting, 
forward thinking, and agile grouping of agencies ready to respond to various 
asymmetric threats, including computer network attack.28 
The Challenges Ahead for US Intelligence and Cyberspace 
The need for information by policy makers and warfighters will only increase. 
The National Command Authorities and the geographic Commanders-in-ChiefS 
will demand more real time intelligence for strategic and tactical planning.29 
The present reactive stance of the community will have difficulty providing 
current intelligence on the broad and diverse spectrum of transnational issues 
and threats. This reactive stance is exacerbated by two problems. The first is the 
organization of the community itself, the second, the management of the huge 
amount of data generated by the various intelligence agencies.3o Overlaid on 
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these two problem areas is this fourth dimension of cyberspace, the battleground 
of the future.31 
Though the current legal paradigm of international and domestic law regard-
ing armed conflict was developed over the past few centuries, this evolved set of 
legal principles allows, for the time being, a practitioner sufficient leeway upon 
which to operate in the fourth dimension of cyberspace.32 
In short, the major hurdles regarding espionage and computer network attack 
are not legal, but organizational and technical. Some of the legal challenges re-
volve around intelligence oversight and the collection of intelligence on US 
persons, as well as the law of war. The intrusive nature of computers and the 
Internet and their use as tools of espionage, and even warfare, cause legal scholars 
and practitioners in national security some concern, not from the lack of prece-
dent, but of policy. 
The Current Domestic Legal Framework 
The current legal framework stems from statutory and regulatory guidance of 
the late 1970s, due to the improprieties by the US intelligence community in 
collecting information on US persons.33 Centered on the National Security Act 
of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, intelligence organizations in the United 
States have been directed to follow certain prescribed procedures regarding the 
conduct of intelligence activities.34 
The National Security Act of 1947, particularly Title V, gives authority 
for various departments and intelligence agencies to conduct intelligence 
gathering, laying out parameters as to what these organizations can or cannot 
not do in the process.35 One of the key statutory conditions is to keep the Con-
gress currently and fully informed on all intelligence activities being con-
ducted.36 
Executive Order 12333, signed by President Reagan, lays out the various 
missions of the intelligence community and gives specific guidance on how to 
conduct intelligence activities.37 Each department promulgates and e:l>.1'ands on 
this guidance through departmental regulations.38 Additionally, there are inter-
nal policy directives that further refine the methods by which the intelligence 
community can collect this intelligence.39 
These rules, coupled with international law, allow the intelligence agencies 
to operate properly in cyberspace. If given the proper mission and authority, 
intelligence organizations can collect information (conduct espionage) in this 
fourth dimension. These operations can be done in peacetime, pre-hostilities 
(intelligence preparation of the battlefield), and during armed conflict. 
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The challenge is developing policy that allows the community to conduct es-
pionage in cyberspace. Proper guidance is essential to ensure that sources and 
methods are not compromised, the operational environment is secure, proper 
counterintelligence concerns are addressed and monitored, and there is proper 
oversight to ensure that the civil rights of US persons are not violated. 
Some Policy Considerations 
Operationally, cyberspace will pose the same challenges that a commander 
would face in a three-dimensional battle. Concepts of speed, mass, maneuver, 
surprise, taking the high ground, command and control, and forward support, 
among others, all apply in cyberspace. The Commander will need to be able to 
operate with as much familiarity and precision in this realm as he would on land, 
sea, or air- integrating all four dimensions seamlessly in achieving full spectrum 
dominance. He will also have to keep in mind, the four operational concepts es-
poused in the concept for future joint operations: dominant maneuver, preci-
sion engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics.4o 
Underlying all of the operational concepts listed above is the premise that new 
and emerging technologies will give joint US forces information superiority in 
any given mission. Information superiority is no longer a theory, but rather opera-
tional doctrine. Information superiority can be likened to the new high ground. A 
force that gains information dominance in the battlespace can shape it by making it 
not only more lethal for the adversary, but survivable for friendly forces. 
A cornerstone in achieving this high ground is proper intelligence prepara-
tion of the battlespace itself using various methodologies, systems, and tech-
niques to allow the commander to be dominant in his maneuver, precisely 
engaging the enemy in whatever dimension, supported by agile, innovative, fo-
cused personnel and organizations. Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations, describes intelligence preparation of the battlespace as 
" ... the continuous process used to develop a detailed knowledge of the adver-
sary system use of information and information systems."41 
The intelligence community's challenge is to determine how far it can go to 
prepare that battlespace. Policy and operational concerns begin to surface as the 
transition takes place from a third dimensional conflict to operations in the 
fourth dimension of cyberspace. In attempting to understand the information 
environment, the operator will need knowledge of, inter alia, the adversary's in-
formation systems; political, economic, social, and cultural makeup; decision 
making process; geographic strengths and weaknesses; and biographical/psy-
chological profiles.42 
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Methods to achieve proper intelligence preparation of the batdespace could 
be intrusive, thereby butting up against privacy and oversight restrictions that 
could hamper and even impede the gathering of this intelligence. Intelligence 
oversight and review organizations will have to be aware of, and add \vithin their 
training and review methodologies, information operations, to include princi-
ples of computer network attack and defense. 
The potential for the inadvertent violation of civil rights of US persons is 
great due to the intrusive capabilities of these tools.43 It must be noted, however, 
that these intrusive techniques have existed for many years and the oversight 
rules are generally sufficient to ensure proper operational use. The term "least 
intrusive means" is a standard in intelligence collection, similar to the propor-
tionality concepts found in the law of armed conflict.44 
As intelligence organizations plan and execute operations to prepare the 
batdespace, policy makers will have to determine how far the intelligence 
operator can go to prepare for any situation along the conflict spectrum. 
Misinterpretation by a potential adversary that this preparation could be indeed 
an attack requires careful planning and oversight to ensure that there is no inad-
vertent response by an aggrieved party on our information or economic 
infrastructure. 
Concluding Thoughts • •• 
It is not constructive to change for change's sake. Faced \vith new issues, the 
law moves slowly, but in most instances the lapse of time allows for the contro-
versy to ripen and be properly resolved.45 In the past this could take years. In this 
day and age, where a "web-year" of three months governs the business of the in-
formation market, the law could quickly become irrelevant and certainly a hin-
drance to both commerce and possibly our national security. 
Practitioners must balance the need for a careful development of the law in 
the area of information operations with the fast-paced reality of the information 
age. The intelligence community itself, like the legal profession, also must de-
velop a strategic plan akin to the vision of the Department of Defense in order to 
move steadily forward in improving organizational structures and developing 
more collaborative and streamlined information systems to support operations 
in cyberspace. 
Where all this will end up is anyone's guess. As in all things new, over-
reactive quick fixes will in the long run cause more confusion and potential harm 
to this nation's security. Additionally, treating information operations as a "dif-
ferent" operational tool for a commander in the field is a mistake. The doctrinal 
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and policy decisions by the Joint Staff to fully integrate information operations in 
operational planning are certainly steps in the right direction. 
Operators and the legal community must continue to work for careful change 
domestically and provide leadership internationally to create appropriate rules in 
which future operations in cyberspace may be conducted within proper legal 
norms. 
As former Secretary of Defense William Cohen declared: 
If you can shut down our financial system, if you could shut down our 
transportation system, if you could cause the collapse of our energy production 
and distribution system just by typing on a computer and c!lusing those links to 
this globalization to break down, then you're able to wage successful warfare and 
we have to be able to defend against that.46 
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